"Re-reforms" of Privatized Pensions in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia and Chile

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A) SUMMARY

In 1981-2010, 11 Latin American countries applied "**structural reforms**" to their public pension systems, totally or partially privatizing them.

Initial design flaws, differences in country features and poor performance, forced "corrections" that did not solve the fundamental problems

Three countries had substantial "re-reforms": Argentina, Bolivia and Chile

At the end of 2014, 9 private systems left; 11 public systems

This presentation:

- identifies improvements and flaws of structural reforms, and
- evaluates whether re-reforms have coped with flaws and how, based on
 9 social security principles:
- 1. Social dialogue
- 2. Universal coverage
- 3. Equal treatment
- 4. Social solidarity
- 5. Gender equity
- 6. Benefit sufficiency
- 7. Efficiency and reasonable administrative costs
- 8. Social participation in the administration
- 9. Financial sustainability

Summary of findings

Influences of re-reforms in rest of Latin America

B) STRUCTURAL REFORM IMPROVEMENTS AND FLAWS

IMPROVEMENTS

- Strengthened the relationship between contributions and pension levels
- improved efficiency in keeping individual accounts
- periodically reported their balance to the insured
- shortened the time for processing benefits
- achieved ample capital accumulation in pension fund and reasonable-to-high capital returns
- created ad hoc superintendence to oversee system

FLAWS

Universal paradigm that fitted all regardless significant socio-economic differences among countries worked in some and failed in others; most reform's assumed effects didn't materialize.

1. Social dialogue

• Chile's reform implemented by military government; other countries had debate

2. Coverage

- Labor force (EAP) stagnant Chile (61%), fell Argentina (45%), lowest/stagnant Bolivia (12%)
- Elderly fell except in Bolivia

3. Equal treatment

• Unification of all supplementary schemes Bolivia, most separate schemes Chile, a few in Argentina, left out armed forces and other groups

4. Social solidarity

• Absent in private systems (reasons) the state in charge of solidarity

5. Gender equity

- Discrimination partly from labor market, but also by the pension system
- Accentuated in private systems: lower female pensions (reasons)
- Women coverage/pension shares lower than men, fell in Argentina; higher elderly in Bolivia

6. Benefit sufficiency

- Minimum pension state-guaranteed; in Bolivia delayed
- Compensation for contributions to public system in Chile, delayed/restricted in Bolivia
- Non-contributory means-tested pension in Argentina and Chile ; Bolivia "universal pension"
- Indexing of pensions to inflation in Bolivia and Chile; at government discretion in Argentina.

7. Efficiency and reasonable administrative costs

- Private system managed by competing firms (AFP), charge commissions and premium
- Assumption that **competition will reduce costs** didn't work properly:
- duopoly in Bolivia; more AFPs in other 2 countries but falling, high concentration, etc.
- Administrative costs as % of wages: high 2-3%; lowest Bolivia (no competition)

8. Social participation in administration

• Elimination of **representation of insured and employers** in managing AFPs

9. Financial sustainability

- Employer contribution eliminated and shifted to worker in Bolivia and Chile
- **Transition costs** high, longer than anticipated and huge gov't debt: highest Chile 5% of GDP
- **Capital in fund/GDP** rising in all countries: Chile 59%, Bolivia 23%, Argentina 12%
- **Capital returns** falling in al countries: Chile: 21% to 10% Bolivia: 12% to 7% Argentina: 9% to 8%
- Investment portfolio well diversified in Chile; highly concentrated in public debt in rest
- Global financial crisis sharply reduced capital and returns, halted further structural reforms

C) RE-REFORMS: FEATURES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS

All re-reforms strengthened the state role in the pension system but with diverse approaches:

Chile (2008) kept the private system but improved it **Argentina** (2008) and **Bolivia** (2010) closed private pillar & integrated it to public system

1. Social dialogue

- **Chile** ample public discussion, Advisory Council with wide representation
- **Bolivia** signed agreement with workers' federation, didn't consult all sectors
- Argentina little public discussion and congressional debates
- In both countries approved by gov't large majority in congress

2. Universal coverage

- EAP and elderly coverage **rose in all countries** due to inclusion policies
- Chile's self-employed mandatorily covered, non-contributory pension expanded
- Argentina included elderly in contributory scheme and expanded non-contributory pension
- Bolivia coverage of non-contributory pension universal

Countries	EAP	ЕАР	Elderly	Elderly
Re-reform	Before	After	Before	After
Argentina	45	48	84	90
Chile	61	65	57	84

Table 1. Increase in Coverage by Re-reforms, 2007-2013

3. Equal treatment

- The armed forces/police schemes or special conditions remain in all countries
- Argentina restored generous schemes of teachers, universities, diplomats, judiciary
- Bolivia granted more liberal conditions to some groups

4. Social Solidarity

Improved in all countries

- **Chile** kept the private system but added two state-financed "solidarity" benefits:
- A **basic solidarity pension** (PBS) ended waiting lists and fiscal restrictions, 60% of the poorest
- A solidarity contribution (APS) supplements contributory pension of those with low income
- The **employer** now pays the disability-survivor premium.
- Argentina extended contributory coverage, especially for lower income groups, removed some restrictions for elderly and mothers
- **Bolivia** universalized non-contributory pension, created semi-contributory pension, solidarity fund and contribution
- In Bolivia and **Chile**, the almost exclusive contribution on the worker infringes ILO norm

5. Gender equity

All improved gender equity compensating mothers for the time raising children:

- Argentina: non-contributory benefit to mothers with 7+ children and no means, universal allowance for each child
- **Chile**: voucher for each child born alive, regardless of income, credited to mother's individual account, accrues annual interest
- **Bolivia**: for solidarity pension, mothers with 10 years of contribution cut one year for each child born alive
- The expansion of the non-contributory pension in all 3 benefitted women more than men; elderly female coverage in 2012 was:

Argentina 92% Chile 63% Bolivia 54%

6. Benefits sufficiency

Improved in all countries:

- Argentina: increased contributory, minimum and basic pensions
- **Bolivia**: new semi-contributory pension (state subsidy), guaranteed individual accounts
- **Chile**: the PBS 80% higher than previous benefit, APS raised contributory pension
- All countries expanded non-contributory pension and its amount (Bolivia very low)
- Pension indexation:

Chile and Bolivia unchangedArgentina now based on wages and contributions

- 7. Efficiency and reasonable administrative costs
- Argentina ended competition and all fees
- Bolivia: until public administrator is set, 2 AFP perform all its functions; fees unchanged
- **Chile** stimulated competition:

biannual **bidding** assigns new labor-force entrants to AFP offering lowest fees net commission fell from 1.63% to 1.14% and winner cut to 0.47%

8. Social participation

- None introduced direct social representation in the management of the pension fund
- Argentina & Chile set advisory boards improving somewhat prior total vacuum

9. Financial Sustainability

Table 2. Accumulated Capital, Capital Returns and Portfolio Concentration, 2013

Countries	Capital in fund		Real capital	Invested in 2 major instruments (%)		
	Million US\$	% GDP	return (%)	State debt	Other	Total
Chile	162,988	62	8,7	22	42	64
Bolivia	9,340	30	5,4	36	44	80
Argentina ^a	48,537	11	-3,0	59	14	73

- Contributions largely unchanged in Argentina and Chile, rose in Bolivia
- Fiscal costs of the transition:
- Chile 1.6% of GDP in 2013; re-reform 0.7%; financial sustainability ensured
- Argentina and Bolivia re-reforms not supported by actuarial studies; face substantial obligations from insured in the public system and in closed private system/pillar
- Argentina prior public system had large state-financed annual deficit, halted by shifting private funds to public fund; deficit will increase 5-fold in 2010-50
- **Bolivia** financial balance can't be estimated; no long-term financial projections of 5 funds

D) CONCLUSIONS

The three re-reforms have improved most flaws of the structural reforms:

- 1. Social dialogue: Chile wide, Bolivia partial, none in Argentina
- 2. Coverage: increased both for EAP and elderly
- 3. Equal treatment: separate schemes continue, some added
- 4. Social solidarity: improved in all
- 5. Gender equity: improved in all
- 6. Benefits sufficiency: improved in all
- **7.** Efficiency and reasonable administrative costs: competition/fess eliminated in Argentina , unchanged in Bolivia, improved in Chile
- 8. Social participation: not restored, advisory boards in Argentina and Chile
- 9. Financial sustainability: strong in Chile, weak in the rest.

- The structural reform was considered a panacea by IFO and many experts and the re-reform should not follow that path
- Both must be preceded by a social dialogue and actuarial studies, be carefully designed taking into account the peculiarities of the country, and improve social security principles
- Re-reform doesn't have to close private system, Chile kept & greatly improved it
- Closing the private system/pillar and integrating it into a public system is viable with the cautions noted particularly on financial sustainability
- Influence in other L A countries with total or partially privatized pension systems

Chile : Presidential Commission 2014-15 elaborating proposal second re-reformEl Salvador: ILO conducting study for re-reformPeru: Diagnosis and proposal for re-reform